Analysis and discussion of a major corporate company and an independent company in the music industry.
The essay documents the history of both organisations, and compares the economic and creative advantages and disadvantages of each company’s resources.
This essay looks at two organisations from the music industry: one an independent record company (Factory Records), the other a large corporate record company (EMI). It explores two ends of the spectrum of the record industry using the examples given, to highlight their differences, but also their similarities. Specifically, the essay will provide a comprehensive history of each example and look at the economic and creative advantages and disadvantages that each possesses.
EMI has been around for much longer than Factory was (EMI began in 1897, Factory in 1978), and EMI is still a hugely successful business, whereas Factory closed its doors for good in 1992. It can be immediately concluded that EMI has been more successful, and that it has more of a history. The purpose of this essay is not, however, to say which company is better or worse, or made more or less money, but to raise questions and investigate reasons for the economical and creative success (and failure) of each.
Thus, the scope of this essay is not large enough to look into every occurrence in the history of EMI’s 100 year reign at the top of the music industry, or Factory’s 15 years as a small independent in a corporate time, but will aim to highlight and discuss the most important happenings throughout their history. In particular, this essay focuses on the advantages and disadvantages that are afforded companies of either means, both in terms of creativity and economics.
There are many inherent differences between small and large businesses, and these are no different in the record industry. A simple way for a small business to know that they have made it is when the bigger companies feel pressured by the smaller, and tend to buy them out, in order to quash any further competition,
‘...the rationale for acquisitions and mergers has been that a well-managed company should take over a weaker rival marketer of competing or complementary products in order to achieve higher growth and savings in operating, managing and marketing costs.’[1]
Smaller companies tend to be able to focus on the creative pursuits of artists with less emphasis on the bottom line, whereas in contrast, larger labels are almost entirely driven by the profit margins and will recruit / attract artists with a view to exploiting their art for financial gain. This and many other differences become apparent when comparing two strikingly different organisations. These are discussed later in the essay.
The money behind large businesses enables them to function in a certain way, in some cases as a big fish eating up the smaller fishes to make themselves stronger and more powerful. In EMI’s case, acquisitions have always been a great part of their business plan, without which they would not have been able to dominate the music industry for as long as they have. Kennedy and McNutty discuss the issue of small labels being acquired by larger companies:
‘Nearly all independent labels created before 1970 have since closed or have been acquired by larger entertainment companies. Music company takeovers and the rise of international conglomerates in the past quarter-century make it nearly impossible for a tiny label to take a regional (American) music style and reach a broad audience. Small labels, however, continue to influence the musical landscape.’[2]
Small businesses are more dynamic, more adaptable, but also more susceptible, to market changes. And in Factory’s case, the philosophy driving the company is able to be the driving force for what it produces. Whether this causes success or failure is identified and discussed later in the essay.
EMI
In the UK, in 1897, the invention of the gramophone heralded the launch of the Gramophone Company, who produced shellac pressed records, who, along with Columbia Graphophone, who produced wax cylinders, make up what we know today as EMI. The two were in competition with each other until the Great Depression in the early 30s, which caused them to join forces and form Electric and Musical Industries (EMI). Before this merger, the two record companies competed for the production and sales of mainly classical and operatic styles music.
By the 1950s, EMI were looking to America for popular artists, and came across a young man named Elvis Presley, who was signed to RCA Victor and Columbia Records. EMI were the licensee for RCA, so were able to release Elvis’ early hits on their pop label HMV. This was obviously a lucrative deal for the imprint, but unfortunately the license only lasted until 1957. With the license coming to an end with RCA and Columbia, EMI needed to find some more artists in the US, so it purchased Capitol Records, signed to which were the likes of Nat King Cole, Frank Sinatra, and Dean Martin.
Back in the UK, EMI’s roster was growing in stature and was leading the UK pop explosion of the late 50s. In 1958, Cliff Richard released his hit ‘Move It’ on EMI, which began the trend of rock and roll into the 60s. In the early 60s, EMI’s Parlophone label signed a Liverpudlian band called The Beatles, which led to a complete shift in UK pop music. Their second release, ‘Please Please Me’, went to no. 2 in the charts. In the US, The Beatles also stormed the charts and created a massive stir.
The Beatles’ visionary manager, Brian Epstein, brought more Liverpool-based acts to EMI, including Gerry and the Pacemakers and Cilla Black, creating a wave called ‘Merseybeat’. Throughout the early 60s, EMI artists held top spots in the UK charts most of the time.
In the USA, the Beach Boys, who would become one of America’s most successful bands, signed to Capitol Records and EMI reaped the benefits. To increase their hold with US music, EMI cut a deal to distribute Motown’s releases outside of the US. This included greats such as Marvin Gaye, Stevie Wonder, Diana Ross and the Supremes, the Jackson 5, and the Temptations.
By now there was little of the music industry that EMI hadn’t penetrated at some point. In the late 60s, progressive rock bands became popular, and bands like Deep Purple, ELO and Pink Floyd joined EMI’s ever-expanding list of acts. Pink Floyd’s ‘Dark Side of the Moon’ album stayed on the Billboard album chart for a groundbreaking 741 weeks (6 years), and is still regarded by some as one of the most influential and popular albums of all time.
In 1977, Queen signed to EMI, releasing Bohemian Rhapsody, a single that would stay at no. 1 for a very long time, as well as set a standard for the music video era. The Rolling Stones also signed that year, but left a few years later (they would return to EMI later with the absorption of Virgin).
During the 70s, EMI expanded their music publishing arm, acquiring the best publishers both in UK and US. The purchase of Screen Gems and Colgems libraries gave EMI a good footing in the film music industry. In 1979, EMI purchased the US label Liberty / United Artists which included the Blue Note label, which was the biggest and most respected jazz label with artists such as Miles Davis and Thelonius Monk on the books.
By the 80s, a new form of music, Heavy metal, was becoming popular. Led Zeppelin and Deep Purple were at the forefront of this movement, as well as Iron Maiden, who signed to EMI and began a long and successful career, still actively touring and recording to this day. Electronic music also became popular at this time, and EMI signed German electronica masters Kraftwerk to the label, who became the first German band to top UK charts.
The 80s proved a challenging, yet profitable, decade for EMI, with their production of the new format of CDs beginning in 1983. They also extended their reach into the music publishing industry with the acquisition of SBK Entertainment World, who owned the rights to ‘Singin’ in the Rain’ and the ‘Wizard of Oz’, and later in 1990, Filmtrax. Other acquisitions in the 80s included the likes of 50% of Chrysalis, whose repertoire included Jethro Tull, Blondie, Spandau Ballet and Sinead O’Connor. The other 50% was bought out in 1990.
Around this time, writing in the Popular Music journal, Dave Laing talks of EMI and their impact in the music industry:
‘For many years, EMI has been regarded as a sleeping giant of the record industry. It has had a steady cash flow thanks to The Beatles and its ownership of labels like Liberty-United Artists which has Fats Domino’s recordings...’[3]
In 1992, EMI bought Virgin Music Group, who were then the largest independent record label in the world. Their artists included Janet Jackson, Peter Gabriel, Smashing Pumpkins, Massive Attack, as well as a welcome returning band, the Rolling Stones. Other artists on EMI’s books in the 90s were Blur, Radiohead, the Spice Girls, Robbie Williams and the Chemical Brothers.
In 1994, EMI acquired 50% of Jobete Music Publishing’s catalogue, which included 15,000 Motown songs. Two years later they acquired Priority Records, a huge urban music label with the likes of Dr Dre, Snoop Dogg, and Ice Cube on their roster.
With their continual expansion into more and more genres of music and more and more countries, creating more and more wealth, EMI set up their Music Sound Foundation, a music charity to help children, teachers and parents get better access to learning and working with music.
Today, some look at the purchasing of CDs as passé, and the digital world that is so pervasive to most people’s lives reaches into the consumption of music. EMI, in 1998, streamed the first album over the internet – Massive Attack’s ‘Mezzanine’. The following year, EMI presented the first digitally downloadable album in the form of David Bowie’s ‘...Hours’. Another landmark in the digital world for EMI is being the first major record company to make its music available digitally without DRM (digital rights management) software. By 2010, EMI expect to make a quarter of their revenue from digital sales.
Owing to a decline in sales (declaring a loss of £260m over the year 2006/7), Terra Firma, a large private equity firm, took control of EMI in August 2007, for £3.2bn. Guy Hands, the new owner of EMI, announced that EMI would be making severe staff cuts during 2008, to reduce operating costs. A number of big artists left the label, most likely in protest of the takeover. These included the likes of Paul McCartney and Radiohead.
EMI has always made money by selling hit records to the public, because ‘...hits are in the first place popular records, but in the second place they are commercial.’[4] Without producing hit records, EMI would need to find alternative ways to make their money. In today’s digital age, where EMI, along with all large record companies, are striving to combat the trend of illegal downloading of music that has had such a huge impact on the industry, a new way of selling hit records needs to be discovered. No answer has yet presented itself to the industry, but they have the greatest minds working on solutions to the problem. It is likely that these solutions will be driven by the consumer / user, perhaps in a social context, following the peer-to-peer model that is used in illegal downloading, or perhaps a subscription-based model.
The apparent economic advantages that EMI have over smaller companies are those that are obvious in any large company: the finances to support decisions made by employees. Huge budgets are made available to take on emerging artists, but more importantly, to purchase smaller record labels (and their catalogues) that have / had brilliant artists signed to them.
Tempting artists away from their smaller (or even similar-sized) label can be done by offering larger sums of money. Robbie Williams’ 2002 contract extension with EMI was the biggest ever deal in the UK, worth £80m over 4 albums. ‘The deal means EMI will take an unusually high share of profit from touring, publishing profits and merchandise - areas where the artists themselves usually make more money’[5].
The examples given of the deals that EMI have made to absorb / acquire smaller labels, or the rights to their catalogues, shows the power of a large corporation in competition. The greater the catalogue or number of artists signed to the imprint, the more sales will be generated. It is not just sales that will be boosted, but the accessibility to creativity. EMI have an advantage over smaller labels in terms of the creative side of things because they have strength in numbers – they are able to harness a powerful array of talent across a vast range of genres.
Another creative advantage that larger labels (EMI included) have over smaller labels is the huge advances that they can afford to pay their artists to make music and do that as a full time job. Artists with smaller or independent companies may have to work another full time or part time job to make enough money to survive, let alone feed their need to create music.
Having the history in pop music that EMI does, it is not surprising the amount of artists that strive to get on the books. Their pioneering of early pop music through artists such as Cliff Richard and The Beatles set a standard for what is now taken for granted in the industry, and acts the world over aspire to the success that EMI brought to those artists.
The success that EMI has given to artists over the years can be viewed by some as detrimental to the art of making music. Artists can forfeit their own talent in order to make a hit record and money for the company. ‘Selling out’ is common in pop music, and many talented individuals or bands have been manufactured into a marketable product, simply to make themselves and the company money.
EMI, like most, if not all, large companies, is driven by the bottom line. If their artists do not make money, then there are repercussions: bands can be dropped; employees backing the bands can be fired etc. It is therefore in the company’s best interest to be risk-averse. Taking risks on music acts can be dangerous. It can be profitable too, but the risks need to be measured.
Factory Records
Tony Wilson, ‘a man seemingly perpetually at odds with the battle between his own intellect and a continual tendency to undermine himself’[6], a local TV presenter for Granada who had his own TV show called ‘So It Goes’ that showcased new musical talent, was also founder of Factory Records along with a team of other unlikely candidates. Getting played or mentioned on his show was seen as a breakthrough for artists.
In Manchester, in 1978, Tony Wilson, with his passion for, knowledge of, and connections in the music industry, teamed up with Alan Erasmus, an actor and band manager, to run a night at a club called the Russell Club. Bands such as The Durutti Column, A Certain Ratio, Cabaret Voltaire, and Joy Division all played at the club and were managed by Wilson and Erasmus. The bands that were associated with the club were all from around Manchester, and were keen to differentiate their unique sound from those produced in London. Rob Gretton, the manager of wunderkind band Joy Division, was a driving force behind this movement. Joy Division are one band that stand out from the pack of bands ‘discovered’ by Wilson, not because of their short life (front-man Ian Curtis killed himself less than 2 years into their career at the age of 21), later to be incarnated as New Order, but because of their incomparable sound and talent. Curtis himself was influenced heavily by the likes of David Bowie and Lou Reed, but Joy Division’s style and sound went beyond what the norm was for the time.
The talent and unique Manchester sound encouraged Wilson and Erasmus to release an EP (A Factory Sample, 1978) on their own record label which they had dubbed Factory Records. Each product that Factory produced was given a number (from the aforementioned EP: FAC 1, to when Tony Wilson died in 2007, and his coffin was branded with FAC 501). Other bands that were on the Factory Record label early on were James and Orchestral Manoeuvres in the Dark (OMD). OMD were one of the first bands that Factory made money on – they released a record and started a bidding war between Virgin and Phonogram, and made £10,000 signing them to Phonogram.
Wilson and Erasmus wanted to make Factory a different kind of record company, different from the corporate world of the late 70s, where the large record labels ruled the airwaves. Their manifesto of signing a band to the Factory imprint was that "The musicians own everything. The company owns nothing..." The label did not own the band or their productions. They would pay for the recordings made and the artists would split the profits 50/50 and were able to leave when they pleased. These deals were unheard of in the music industry, where labels would contract acts for a number of albums or years, paying royalties made on the sales of those records. Factory was different. As Mick Middles states:
‘It is not the greatest label in the world, nor the most artistically sussed, and it is certainly not the most commercially aware. Its overall roster has been rather fat and cumbersome; it has been hip and unhip, trendy and hackneyed. It has always, however, retained a wholly idiosyncratic identity. It has always been Factory.’[7]
Before Factory Records, independent record labels were there to release records of new artists acting as the A&R for the major record labels. Major labels would hear the bands on independents and then sign them, paying the independent a sort of ‘finder’s fee’. In a BBC documentary on Factory Records, Tony Wilson talks about the inception of the Factory manifesto and change it inadvertently had on the UK music industry:
‘What people don’t realise is that independent distribution is a way to get your band recognised and signed to a major. The fulcrum moment in the history of British independent record companies came when Rob Gretton said, “Why don’t we do our first record with you, before we go to Warner Bros [Genetic]?” ...that was the moment when British independent record companies became ‘real companies’, when the idea was to stay with your label and not sign to some major.’[8]
Along with Wilson and Erasmus was producing genius, Martin Hannett, and talented graphic designer, Peter Saville. With this team, the record company functioned out of Erasmus’ small home on Palatine Road in Manchester. Following a surprisingly successful Factory Records mixed EP, came the first Factory LP: Joy Division’s ‘Unknown Pleasures’. Made with an investment of £23,000 from Wilson, it was Factory’s first real ‘contractless’ contract with a band. The deal was 50/50, like the Factory Sample EP and the publishing came out of Factory’s 50%. Mick Middles talks of the downsides of releasing of an album with an independent like Factory,
‘Releasing your own album rather lacks the power of going with a major. The record doesn’t, for example, instantly materialise on record racks across the country, to be accompanied by displays, hoardings and television advertising. That kind of magic, so alluring to any young band, would be missing.’[9]
Martin Hannett, the producer behind Joy Division’s Unknown Pleasures, was seen as one of the best in the industry, owing to his, if somewhat eccentric and unusual, techniques and vision. Tony Wilson remembers Hannett’s prowess in Mick Middles’ book:
‘Martin was particularly interested in echo and digital delay and that the essential concept of what you do as a producer is to take all the sounds into your mixing desk, strip these sounds to their perfect, naked form and then you, the producer, start creating imaginary rooms for each sound. That is how Martin saw it. He had a really visual sense that most people just don’t have... he could see sound, shape it and rebuild it.’[10]
The advantage that the genius of Hannett gave to the label, although he did walk out a few times and leave it all behind, was that he was a visionary in a new era of music. His understanding of sound brought the digital time of music to the fore and Joy Division were able to pioneer the sound, taking them to market.
‘Unknown Pleasures’ was hugely successful and was followed soon after by ‘Closer’, Joy Division’s second release, which was released shortly after Curtis’ suicide, and included the popular single ‘Love Will Tear Us Apart’ which made the top 20.
After Curtis’ death, Joy Division changed their name to New Order who, along with Wilson and Erasmus, set up a club in Manchester called the Hacienda / FAC51. The club was the vision of Rob Gretton, Joy Division / New Order’s manager, and was an outlet for Factory’s bands, as well a venue for wider talent: Madonna played her first UK gig there in 1984, for TV show ‘The Tube’ before she made it big. The success of the club was unfortunately fraught with financial problems related to low ticket and bar prices (both associated with their ethos of being different to the mainstream). The club was hugely popular, because of the acts and the music played there and also the cheap entry and bar prices. It was mainly down to sales from New Order’s records that kept the club afloat.
During the mid-80s, when the decision was made to raise prices on the bar, very little difference was noticed, owing to the fact that the drug ecstasy was gaining popularity and was being taken instead of drinking alcohol.
A band named the Happy Mondays, were at the forefront of the emergence of a new drug-fuelled culture called ‘Rave’, in the mid-80s. They were ‘signed’ to Factory by Wilson following a battle-of-the-bands at the Hacienda (in which they came last), and became a resident band at the club, driving the new music and drug-addled dance culture, coined ‘Madchester’. Resident DJs Mike Pickering, Graeme Park, and Dave Haslam added to this scene with their playing of ‘acid house’ music at the Hacienda. Towards the 90s it became a club known for its crazy nights which were stimulated by drugs, especially ecstasy and psychedelic drugs like acid and LSD.
Even though the club was riddled with drugs, it was full every night and was making a healthy profit. But by 1991, violence inside and outside the club, caused by rival gangs trying to gain control of the drug market, made the Hacienda a very dangerous place to be. Factory and New Order were forced to close the club for safety reasons. It was able to reopen with new security measures in place and continued to be a breeding ground for up-and-coming acts in Manchester and for the dance scene to evolve for the next six years, but closed its doors for good in 1997.
By the 90s, many British cities had more or less accepted the fact that they were competing on a now ‘global’ stage and ‘futures depended on attracting and generating new investments and new business through an openness to private sector cooperation and partnership; new planning flexibility; local tax and funding incentives.’[11] The regeneration of a city like Manchester, which took place in the early to mid 90s, was in many cases, driven by its cultural and creative industries. Factory, indirectly, and inadvertently, some might say, can be credited with helping with the regeneration of run down areas of Manchester through the early 90s. Writing about this, Giacomo Botta talks about the scene in Manchester as,
‘Developing a fascination for the dilapidated city centre, using run down factories as rehearsal rooms or gig venues. This fascination grew into entrepreneurialism with the Hacienda FAC 51... An urban cluster formed, as new clubs, record stores, and small shops opened in the same area, while the club became famous all over the world.’[12]
The areas which were most run down and decrepit were those such as the Northern Quarter, where Factory Records set up shop and opened the Hacienda which were at the forefront of the regeneration. The popularity / infamy of the Hacienda spread throughout the world, as Dave Haslam states,
‘As the Hacienda became known as one of the best clubs in Europe, and bands like The Smiths and then the Stone Roses emerged, the Manchester scene featured on the front of Newsweek magazine in America and multiple issues of NME and the Face. This was 1989, 1990. Politicians, investors and developers probably are not readers of these magazines, but still word reached them that the music made in Manchester and the club culture, particularly the Hacienda, was of international quality. Manchester was on the map.’[13]
So, the area became a hotbed for development of shops and cafes that played on their proximity and affinity with the club. Despite its bad press and occasional violence, the city council of Manchester were pleased to have the Hacienda as a cultural centre that was acknowledged worldwide. But by 1997, the trouble with drug dealers and violence associated with the club meant it had to be shut down for good.
Factory Records’ major earners in the late 80s to early 90s were The Happy Mondays and New Order, but getting them to make records in the party environment was a hard task. Shaun Ryder, the front-man of the Happy Mondays was plagued by addiction to heroin. Factory paid for the Happy Mondays to go to Jamaica to record their fourth album, ‘Yes, Please’, as the island was clean of heroin. What they didn’t look into was the fact that Jamaica was the crack capital of the world, so with the lack of heroin, Shaun Ryder became addicted to that instead. After a month in the Caribbean, The Happy Mondays returned with very little in the way of recordings. At the same time, New Order went to Ibiza to record their next album, but returned similarly, £400,000 later, with a rusty recording of their album ‘Republic’.
By 1992, Factory Records was on the downturn, with the productions of New Order and Happy Monday’s albums creating a real dent in the funds. Talks began with London Records, a label that was owned by British Decca. London / Decca were bought by Polygram in 1979, which enabled the label to take the form of an independent subsidiary of Polygram, hence the interest of Factory Records. Unfortunately, London Records found out that Factory had not signed contracts with their artists and in fact the catalogue of songs belonged to each artist and in fact, Factory were worth nothing. This moment is reflected in a meeting between London and Factory described by Mick Middles:
‘The thing is that when we heard that you didn’t have any contracts, we weren’t that concerned. You may not own the bands, but you always have the back catalogue, unless of course you have a piece of paper that states “...the musicians own everything and we own nothing!”’[14]
This piece of paper refers to the ‘contract’ that Wilson and Erasmus wrote up when Joy Division joined the ranks, which some say was written in Wilson’s blood. This realisation stopped any deal going forth, and Factory Communications Ltd was forced to declare bankruptcy in November 1992.
The Happy Mondays and New Order then joined London Records, which was soon to be acquired by Warner Music Group.
The advantages and disadvantages of Factory Records’ economics and creativity seem quite clear. Their financial decisions did not seem to follow any conventional model used in the music industry. Obviously the creativity of the bands that ‘signed’ to Factory was left to blossom of its own accord, without any real nurturing or force towards a particular sound. This was an attractive offer to many talented bands that would be able to record an album, split any profits with the label, but stay free from any binds that would tie them into that label for a number of years. Tony Wilson sees the Factory deal as the ‘best deal given to any musicians in history – to this day’[15].
The financial gambles taken by the label were huge: Tony Wilson putting up the money for Joy Division’s first album, without any insurance for returns, New Order’s purchase of the Hacienda club, where Factory committed itself to ‘placing the comparative ‘low art’ of rock music in such stylish, hugely expensive and wholly innovative packaging,’ was financially risky. But Tony Wilson, and the label, thrived on this risk. Factory’s brand name carried a lot of weight, as did the Hacienda. Any business would be glad to have the brand awareness advantages that Factory had.
Aside from a few cases, e.g. James and Orchestral Manoeuvres in the Dark, who recorded with Factory then left for another label, this approach seemed a successful model for Factory. Joy Division / New Order and the Happy Mondays stayed with Factory, owing to the philosophy surrounding the label, as well as the great 50/50 deals they had, and made a number of successful albums. Unfortunately, this philosophy would be the label’s downfall too. Had they made contracts for the catalogues of their bands, London / Polygram would have bought them out, leading to profits for all the stakeholders.
Lack of control of a band is something that is generally avoided in the music industry, owing to the volatile nature of many artists in the industry. Because of their talent, musicians can often turn to drugs and alcohol to escape their lives, and without a controlling force, i.e. a record label that acts as a type of parent, it could be said that musicians can go off the rails. On the other hand, a laissez-faire attitude from a label gives acts the freedom for utmost creativity that could otherwise be hindered by an imprint with too much involvement. The latter is what Factory did well, but the former occurred too with cases like the Happy Mondays.
Creativity of artists, no matter what medium, is often quashed by the pressures of commercial success. Without the latter, in many cases the former cannot continue, but the latter also requires the former. It is a vicious cycle. Simon Frith discusses the dilemma that faces art and commerce in pop music: ‘The artist, the innovator, tends to see him/herself in opposition to the industry as a commercial enterprise which appears to be continually pressuring the artist to produce new marketable products.’[16]
The two examples given in this essay illustrate starkly the two ends of the spectrum of the music industry. The main objectives of each may differ: EMI to make money; and Factory to allow talented artists to make music; but at the heart of both is the aim to deliver the wonderful art of music to a general public. For an artist signed to EMI, the pressures from the label to create a product that will sell is of utmost importance, but with Factory, took away any of these pressures, and the artist was free to produce what their creativity led them to.
The histories of the two examples in this essay tell two fundamentally different stories:
Looking at EMI’s history, it tells a tale of an ever-expanding conglomerate that swallows up financially weaker and smaller, but creatively more powerful labels, to add elements of diversity to its books. This in turn boosts the company’s profits as the range of music released is wider and therefore a wider audience is gained. The talent that was signed to the EMI was of the very upper echelons of popular (and less popular) music and the label has sat in the top five labels in the music industry for over a century. A number of bands that have joined or been forced to join (through acquisitions) EMI’s have produced some of the most famous, popular and brilliant albums known to date, and EMI, along with the artists, have reaped their benefits.
The story of Factory records is one of the fight for creative expression and rebellion against a corporate-ruled industry; albeit a badly managed and financially unsound one. The label, like many small independent labels, began with a mission to put exciting, new and creatively brilliant music from a certain area out to the public, with very little emphasis on making a profit. Its bands were, if nothing else, different, and in some cases unstable. This would inevitably cause a company concern, but Factory rolled with the punches and stuck by their philosophy, in the face of a world where their source of income, 50% of their bands’ sales, could be taken away at any moment with the band being poached by a potentially more financially attractive deal from a major label.
Ultimately, the label failed and had to succumb to being swallowed by a larger company (London Records, who were later acquired by a larger company still), but were able to keep some of the values and personality that made it what it was.
Even though there was ultimately no money made, where the deal with Polygram / London Records fell through, Tony Wilson stands by the philosophy of Factory and states that ‘I wouldn’t change anything. I think that the idea that we had this innocence belief that the musicians should own everything, it was their work. It was a wonderful innocence to have.’[17]
As to which company I would rather work for, I would have to choose Factory Records. The reasons for this choice would not be financially driven, but based on the label’s philosophy enabling creativity to flow freely and providing an opportunity to those talented artists who could not abide by the restrictive boundaries that are imposed by large corporate organisations. If I wanted to make money, however, I would choose EMI...!
[1] Doole, I., & Lowe, R., International Marketing Strategy (3rd Ed.), London, Thomson Learning, 2001
[2] Kennedy, R., and McNutt, R., Little Labels – Big Sound: Small Record Companies and the Rise of American Music, Indiana University Press, 1999
[3] Laing, D., The Big Gets Bigger, Popular Music, Vol. 8, Issue 2, Cambridge University Press, 1989
[4] Frith, S., Popular Music: Critical Concepts in Media and Cultural Studies, Routledge, 2004
[5] Robbie signs ‘£80m’ deal, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/music/2291605.stm, 02/10/2002
[6] Kennedy, J., Joy Division and the Making of Unknown Pleasures, Unanimous Ltd, 2006
[7] Middles, M., From Joy Division to New Order: The true story of Anthony H Wilson and Factory Records, Virgin Books, 1996
[8] Wilson, A., in Factory: Manchester, from Joy Division to Happy Mondays, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/musictv/factory/video/
[9] Middles, M., From Joy Division to New Order: The true story of Anthony H Wilson and Factory Records, Virgin Books, 1996
[10] Tony Wilson in Middles, M., From Joy Division to New Order: The true story of Anthony H Wilson and Factory Records, Virgin Books, 1996
[11] Brown, A., O’Connor, J., and Cohen, S., Local Music Policies Within A Global Music Industry: Cultural Quarters In Manchester And Sheffield, 2000, in Shrinking Cities, 2004
[12] Botta, G., Pop Music, Cultural Sensibilities and Places: Manchester 1976-1997, Department of Social policy, University of Helsinki, published as a paper for ESF-LiU Conference “Cities and Media: Cultural Perspectives on urban Identities in a Medatized World”, Vadstena 25-29 October 2006, www.ep.liu.se/ecp/020
[13] Haslam, D., Manchester, England, Shrinking Cities, 2004
[14] Polygram spokesperson in a meeting with Factory, in Middles, M., From Joy Division to New Order: The true story of Anthony H Wilson and Factory Records, Virgin Books, 1996
[15] Wilson, A., in Factory: Manchester, from Joy Division to Happy Mondays, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/musictv/factory/video/
[16] Frith, S., Popular Music: Critical Concepts in Media and Cultural Studies, Routledge, 2004
[17] Wilson, A., in Factory: Manchester, from Joy Division to Happy Mondays, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/musictv/factory/video/
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